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Abstract An econometric model is utilized to simulate
the effects of a policy change in which government fmancial
assistance to a major Canadian marine fishery is withdrawn
and the industry is placed on a commercially viable basis.
Under near-ideal conditions of marketing and harvesting, har-
vesting employment would fall drastically, from approximately
thirty thousand fishermen under the current regime to approx-
imately six thousand. There would be a concomitant fall in
seasonal fish plant employment, and a severe fall in those fed-
eral transfer payments (e.g., unemployment insurance) which
are currently generated by extensive seasonal employment in
both harvesting and processing sectors of the fishery.
The policy analysis consists of simulations with a prototype
econometric model which integrates the demand, processing,
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and harvesting sectors of the fishery. The essential component.s
of the 1,000-equation model are described.
Introduction
Important in the cultural and economic life of the Province of
Newfoundland and Labrador, the fishery has traditionally pro-
vided relatively low income employment for a substantial num-
ber of workers, many of them independent small boat "inshore"
fishermen, and has relied on sizable government assistance. In
recent years, there has been much talk of reducing government
financial involvement in the fishing industry, an industry that
has seen many of its companies become insolvent. In this paper,
a large simulation model of the Newfoundland groundfishery is
used to investigate the employment prospects of an economically
viable fishery. The fishery is here defined as viable when the
offshore harvesting and processing sectors take no financial
losses and fishermen earn incomes in excess of the poverty line.
The results suggest that such employment prospects are very
poor indeed.
In the next section we provide, as background, a brief over-
view of the role of the fishery in the Newfoundland economy
and of the present state of that economy. We then discuss the
structure of the model, following which we apply the model to
determine the economic and employment prospects of the fish-
ery under a variety of conditions. We then test the sensitivity
of the model (and, perhaps, of the fishery) to a number of changes
in conditions. Finally, we present our conclusions. An appendix
contains the model's key equations.
The Fishery and Economic Conditions in Newfoundland
The Newfoundland economy is driven, essentially, by its re-
source base and by its government and service sectors. There
is only a miniscule manufacturing sector separate from that as-
sociated with its resource industries. At the height of the fishing
season, in July 1985, out of an official labor force of 225,000,
Newfoundland had 48,000 workers unemployed, a seasonally ad-Employment Prospects in a Commercially Viable Eishery 239
justed unemployment rate of 21.3%.' The Canadian equivalent
was 10.5%, a figure itself usually considered to be exceedingly
high. These comments provide an important part of the per-
spective within which the following analysis is to be viewed.
It is important to bear in mind, in this context, that the fishery
has traditionally, whether appropriately or not, played the role
of employer of last resort. The province's fishery currently pro-
vides employment for about 28,000 people in the harvesting sec-
tor and about 8,500 in the processing sector.^ At least 600 com-
munities rely on the fishery almost exclusively as a source of
employment^ and there are about 85 fish processing plants with
freezing capacity/ the plants often being the only source of non-
fishing employment in the community. Fish exports from New-
foundland are largely in the form of frozen fillets and blocks.
This paper is concerned only with frozen fish products.
In recent years many of the Newfoundland fishing firms be-
came insolvent and were superceded by Fishery Products in-
ternational (FPl), a firm owned jointly by the Federal and New-
foundland governments, and the Bank of Nova Scotia. The
creditors of the predecessor companies received $75M in federal
funds early in 1984 and the new company anticipated—as of
October 1984—losses of $25M in 1984 while requesting a further
$125M from government "to cover projected operating losses
and capital improvements over the next five years.""^ Actual
losses in 1984 were $35 million and losses in 1985 were $20 mil-
lion.* The goal of Fishery Products International is to turn a
profit and return the company to private interests;^ the goal of
government is to create a viable industry.** With profits projected
for 1986, FPI is speculating on a possible sale to private interests
in 1987 or 1988."
Pursuing the background still further, government subsidies
to the Newfoundland fishery in 1981 amounted to about 4.5% of
sales when measured in terms of GATT regulations, but total
government expenditures in the Newfoundland fishery (includ-
ing standard administrative expenditures, transfers to individ-
uals—including unemployment insurance benefits—and subsi-
dies to companies) in the same year, for instance, equalled more
than SIOOM, a value nearly equal to that of landings.'^240 William E. Schrank, Noel Roy, and Eugene Tsoa
Clearly, the Newfoundland fishery is an industry with prob-
lems. In their 1980 report on Newfoundland, the Economic
Council of Canada recommended "that gear, boat, and other
subsidies to the fishery be discontinued."" a drastic remedy
with serious implications that the report did not address. Another
possibility was mentioned by the chairman of the Royal Com-
mission on the Economic Union and the Development Prospects
for Canada who has been quoted as saying that "the inshore
fishery in Atlantic Canada has got to go," although Mr. D. S.
MacDonald is also supposed to have said that the government
would be responsible for finding other jobs for the displaced
inshore fishermen.'' Considering the figures cited at the begin-
ning of this paper, finding such jobs might be difficult.
Mr. M. Kirby, in the 1982 report of his Task Force on Atlantic
Fisheries, was more cautious. His first priority was that the
"Atlantic fishing industry should be economically viable." His
second priority was that fisheries employment "should be max-
imized subject to the constraint that those employed receive a
reasonable income—including fishery-related income transfer
payments."'^ While his first priority calls for a viable fishery,
the conditions of Kirby's second priority, however, imply that
the fishery will continue to be unviable into the foreseeable fu-
ture. One might argue that Kirby's first two priorities are in-
herently in conflict.
It is only in MacDonald's statement, if the quotation was cor-
rect, that the possible consequences of a "viable" fishery were
directly and bluntly drawn.
The remainder of this paper discusses the application of a
simulation model of the Newfoundland groundfishery to the an-
alysis of the employment prospects of a viable fishery. The con-
text is provided by the comments earlier in the paper of the state
of the Newfoundland economy, the state of the Newfoundland
fishery, and the stated objective of the government to render the
industry viable.
The Model
The mode!,"* as sketched in the flow diagram (Figure 1), has
three main sectors: marketing (or demand), processing, and har-Employment Prospects in a Commercially Viable Fishery 241
FIGURE 1. Flow diagram; An economic model of the Newfoundland
groundfishery.242 r . '• WiUiam E. Schrank, Noel Roy, and Eugene Tsoa
vesting. The demand submodel consists of an inventory adjust-
ment mechanism that in essence yields a demand function for
each of the products of the industry. Since the United States is
by far the predominant market for Newfoundland fish, the mar-
keting relationships concern the demand in the United States for
the particular products that are produced in Newfoundland: pri-
marily cod, redfish and flatfish frozen blocks and frozen fillets.
Exogenous values entering this sector of the model (numbers in
parenthesis correspond to boxes on the flow chart) are United
States income (2),'- fish prices (3), and inventories of frozen fish
products (4). Once the United States demand is known, the Ca-
nadian share (1) of that demand is determined, and finally the
Newfoundland share of the Canadian output.
The demand submodel (5) generates the saleable output (7) of
the fish processing industry, and this output provides the linkage
to the processing sector (10). With the prices of the factors of
production (8)"* and the number of plants (6) as exogenous in-
puts, the processing sector submodel consists of a series of equa-
tions showing the amount required of each of the inputs to the
production process (9). One of these inputs, of course, is fish
(12) and this input provides a linkage to the harvesting sector
(14). This linkage indicates the volume offish that must be caught
to supply the plants with the raw material required to produce
the frozen fish products that the marketing sector has been
shown to be able to absorb.
We use historical allocators to assign the required catch to
various techniques (13) and to specified biological stocks (II).
The harvesting subsector of the model then operates in two
stages: first, it determines the amount of fishing effort (16) that
is required for the specified technique to catch the specified
quantity offish, given the fish population (17); and second, once
the amount of required effort, the number of days fishing per
vessel per year (20), and the crew size per vessel (23) are known,
the number of vessels (19), number of fishermen (22), and har-
vesting costs (21) are determined. Finally, harvesting sector rev-
enues (15) and total costs can be determined, and the economic
surplus (18) computed. The economic surplus, if negative, is de-
fined as the implied subsidy that must be paid to the harvesting
sector per dollar of revenue.'^-'**Employment Prospects in a Commercially Viable Fishery 243
Before continuing, it might be useful to provide a perspective
on the scope of the model. If only one species of fish were in-
volved (e.g., cod), and only one product was produced (e.g.,
frozen cod fillets), and there was only one biological stock of
cod (e.g., northern cod) which was caught with only a single
type of gear (e.g.. the bottom otter trawl) from a single type of
vessel (e.g., the 500-ton stern trawler), then the entire model
would consist of about 35 equations. But the Newfoundland
groundfishery is more complicated than that. Not only is there
cod, but redfish and four species of flatfish. Not only is there
northern cod, but there are two other cod stocks, as well as eight
redfish stocks and seven stocks of the flatfish species. There are
seven gear types, from handlines to trawls, and there are six
classes of vessels, from small motor boats of 18' to trawlers of
150'.''* In 1981, there were more than 96 species/stock/gear type/
vessel class combinations used in the Newfoundland ground-
fishery. As a result of this diversity of the fishery, the model
consists of 1,000 equations. In addition to its econometric as-
pects, the model provides an accounting and input/output frame-
work for the analysis of the fishery.
We briefly describe each of the econometric components of
the model; detailed specifications are relegated to an appendix.
Demand
The econometric component of the demand sector of the model
consists of Nerlovian inventory adjustment-price expectations
submodels built for the major products of the Newfoundland
groundfishery. Each of the submodels includes the following
equations:""
1. A desired stock function in which inventories desired by
suppliers are determined from price expectations;
2. A partial adjustment function for inventories;
3. An equation to determine price expectations;
4. A demand function; and
5. An identity expressing the change in inventory as the dif-
ference between the supply of and demand for the fish prod-
uct during a single period.William E. Schrank, Noel Roy, and Eugene Tsoa
It would be inappropriate to estimate a demand function alone,
although this is often done in fisheries demand analysis, because
of problems of simultaneous-equation bias. To completely avoid
such problems would require the development of a supply side
for the U.S. fishery. In addition to amounting to an overly-long
digression in the development of a Newfoundland model, theie
are serious potential specification errors to be encountered in
modeling the supply side because of inadequate knowledge of
the biological relationships underlying the harvesting process.
We adopt the Nerlovian model for the joint purposes of avoiding
the specification bias that would result from modeling supply
and of reducing the simultaneous-equation bias that would result
from neglecting supply effects entirely.-'
Equation (6) in the Appendix is the estimation equation de-
rived from the Nerlovian structure. Although the estimating
equation appears superficially to be similar to a conventional
demand equation, il is more than that: it is derived from a multi-
equation model and each parameter has a structural interpre-
tation. As an example, note in Equation (6) that the coefficient
of the lag of the change in inventories has implications for the
speed at which price expectations and inventories adjust.
Processing
The objective in developing an econometric processing sector is
to specify the production technology of the fish products indus-
try in order to permit inferences to be made regarding the effects
of changes in relative prices (such as energy prices and of wages),
the repercussions of investment incentives, and the effectiveness
in increasing yields from fish inputs by changing the factor mix.
To accomplish this purpose, factor inputs must be specified in
detail and we define five inputs: labor, materials (primarily fish),
energy, and two elements of capita! investment: plant on the one
hand and equipment on the other. Since little is known about
the relationships between these inputs in the fish processing in-
dustry, it is desirable that we place few restrictions on the re-
lationships that are to be estimated. The approach taken here^^
is to utilize the duality relationship explored by Shephard (1953)Employment Prospects in a Commercially Viable Fishery 245
to estimate the production parameters indirectly through the
specification of the cost function. Application of Shephard's
Lemma to Parks' (1971) and Woodland's (1975) extension of the
Generalized Leontief functional form proposed by Diewert
(1971) yields a series of equations (represented by Equation (7)
in the Appendix) which define the cost-minimizing input of each
factor of production.
Harvesting
The core of the harvesting sector of the model lies in production
functions for each specific fish stock. The traditional approach
in fisheries economics is to specify a constrained Cobb-Douglas
function with unit exponents which relates the catch of fish to
the fishing effort exerted and the fish population to which that
effort is applied. Since catch reduces population, the traditional
''Schaefer" model" includes a population dynamics equation as
well as a production function:
Q = kEP (i)
dPidt = aP - bP^ - Q (ii)
where Q is catch, E effort, P population, dPldt the time deriv-
ative of population, and k, a, and b are parameters to be
estimated.
Three problems which immediately arise concern the mea-
surement of fish populations, the restricted functional form of
the production function, and the definition of effort.
Regarding the first problem, the biology profession has de-
veloped a series of methods for obtaining population estimates.
The quahty of these estimates, which are crucial in the setting
of catch quotas, is a matter of some dispute.^** Rather than use
the biologists' estimates, economists usually prefer to manipu-
late the Schaefer model to achieve a single equation which can
then be estimated using only catch and effort data. Thus the
problem of population is solved; population need not be deter-
mined prior to estimation.
Since Equation (i) is a constrained Cobb-Douglas function, a246 - William E. Schrank, Noel Roy, and Eugene Tsoa
logical solution to the second problem, that of the restricted form
of the production function, is to estimate the more general Cobb-
Douglas form. This generalization is adopted in the model and
Equations (9) and (10) in the Appendix portray the "generalized
Schaefer" model.^^ Equation (11) is the nonlinear estimating
equation.
The third problem concerns the measurement of effort. In the
overview of the model, we indicated that numerous combina-
tions of gear types and vessel classes were used in the New-
foundland groundfishery. If cod of a certain stock are fished by
handlining from dories and also by otter trawling from large stern
trawlers, then clearly one cannot add the number of days fishing
from dories to the number of days fishing from trawlers to obtain
a meaningful effort variable. Fifteen men on a multi-million dollar
trawler will not have the same average daily catch as two men
with handlines in a $15,000 trap boat.
Our approach to this problem is to standardize fishing effort
in terms of the average catch per day using a particular technique
taken as norm.-*' Using the average daily catch obtained when
longlining from intermediate sized longliners (50' vessels) as
norm, we establish the relative productivities by fitting a multiple
regression equation of the logarithm of catch per unit effort on
a number of binary dummy variables. The dummy variables
serve to define the technique, the fish stock, and time (the latter
to isolate effects of technical change). Equation (12) in the Ap-
pendix is the relationship used to estimate the relative produc-
tivities of alternative fishing techniques. Equation (13) shows the
calculation for the relative productivity weights which are used
to compute an aggregate effort variable (for use in estimating the
generalized Schaefer model) as a linear combination of the effort
expended using the individual techniques.
We return to our primary problem of estimating the parameters
of the production function. Since the Schaefer model involves
a population dynamics equation, fish stocks with a biological
integrity should determine the data base. The growth pattern of
northern cod and Gulf redfish are surely different, so the pa-
rameters "a" and "^" from the population dynamics equation
are expeeted to vary from stock to stock. Since our modei relatesEmployment Prospects in a Commercially Viable Fishery 247
to a fishery with eighteen distinct stocks, the model should in-
clude eighteen pairs of production functions and population dy-
namics equations. We secure convergence for nine of the eight-
een stocks.
For each of these nine stocks, we now have a nonlinear re-
lationship between effort and catch, with population acting as a
constraint on catch, and with dynamics incorporated into the
analysis so that world catch in one year affects the population
in the next and therefore changes the amount of effort that must
be applied to obtain a fixed harvest. As a byproduct of the an-
alysis, we obtain population figures which may be better than
those generated by the use of biologists' techniques. While we
are careful to avoid making too extravagant a claim, the possi-
bility of econometric techniques generating the best available
biological estimates is an exciting one, at least for economists.
Policy Analysis
The problem posed at the start of this paper is to determine the
employment implications of a commercially viable Newfound-
land fishery. We shall use the model to make this determination
under quasi-ideal conditions.
We assume that the Newfoundland groundfishery has reached
a state where fish stocks are fully restored, catches are at their
maintainable maximum, the catch of all species is of first quality,
this quality is maintained throughout the processing and mar-
keting operations, and ail the processed fish can be sold. We
also assume, as a starting point, that market prices of processed
fish, processing and harvesting costs, relative (and absolute)
productivities of fishing techniques, and catch allocations by
fishing technique remain in our imaginary future the same as they
were in 1981, the final year in the period for which the model
was built." As with any simulation, alternative assumptions
could easily be used but, although 1981 was not a particularly
good year, subsequent years have been poor and will hopefully
prove to be atypical. The alternative possibility of forecasting
future costs, prices, productivity, and allocations would, we be-
lieve, simply confuse the basic questions under consideration.248 William E. Schrank, Noel Roy, and Eugene Tsoa
We desire to know the economic state of the fishery under
these conditions. An alternative way of viewing the problem is
that we are seeking to determine the long-term economic pros-
pect of the industry, as currently structured, under quasi-ideal
catch and marketing conditions.
To suggest the power and scope of the model, we have de-
scribed all of its econometric components. For the particular
policy problem under consideration, however, we assume that
the entire output of the processing sector can be sold at the
assumed price, thus making the demand sector redundant for the
purposes of this simulation. In the first stage of the application
of the model to this problem, therefore, we bypass the demand
submodel and apply the generalized Schaefer analysis to deter-
mine the quasi-ideal catch.^** We then convert three formerly
endogenous marketing submodel variables into exogenous vari-
ables, and assign them values (essentially in Block 7 of Figure
1) that, when filtered through the processing sector, generate a
demand for raw fish equal to the quasi-ideal harvest (Block 12
of Figure 1). The remainder of the application of the model is
conventional.
Kirby (1982, p. 119) chooses a \9% gross margin as a target
rate, where the gross margin is defined as the value of sales less
the cost of sales expressed as a percentage of sales. At this mar-
gin, he finds that trawler plants cover their capital costs and
obtain reasonable net earnings. In addition, he judges this to be
a realistic margin in that it was obtained in 1978, although the
gross margin has deteriorated seriously since then. As a bench-
mark, we define the fishery as being viable when firms that own
both the offshore harvesting fleet and the processing plants earn
a gross margin sufficient to cover their capital costs^^ and fish-
ermen earn incomes in excess of the poverty line. Table 1 sum-
marizes the results for each of eight simulation experiments.
Run 1 replicates 1981 conditions. The catch of cod. flatfish,
and redfish are the actual 1981 figures for the Newfoundland
harvest of the eighteen stocks which appear in the model. In this
benchmark experiment, the fishery requires approximately 12K
fishermen, the processing sector requires about 17M man-hours
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Holding all the cotiditions of Run 1 constant except that
catches increase to the quasi-ideal values discussed above. Run
2 shows that the required number of fishermen rises to 30K,
processing plant employment rises to 36M man-hours and the
gross margin remains unchanged.^'' If we assume a poverty line
income of $12K," and that two-thirds of an inshore fishermen's
income arises from groundfish operations, then, for both Run 1
and Run 2, small-boat-*^ and small longliner fishermen on average
earn far less than the poverty line income. Since vessel per-
formance usually varies considerably even within a particular
vessel class (Hilborn, 1985), this does not preclude the viability
of some inshore enterprises under the hypothesized conditions.
Such viability would be atypical.
Under conditions of the first two runs, the gross margin is an
entirely inadequate 6.9%. Several options may be available to
increase the margin: product price can increase relative to costs;
processing costs can be reduced by rationalizing plant opera-
tions; or harvesting costs can be reduced by lowering the price
of fish paid^^ to inshore fishermen (thereby also lowering the
harvest revenue basis of trawlermen's share payments).^'' The
first of these options is discussed in the next section. The second
option has been the subject of considerable political controversy
in Newfoundland over the last several years (and will continue
to be given the five year management plan of Fishery Products
International Ltd.), but the analysis is beyond the current ca-
pabilities of the model. In the remainder of this section, there-
fore, we consider the effects of reducing the price of harvested
fish.
In Run 3, the price of fish falls by 22% to generate a gross
margin of 19%, the value suggested by Kirby. With the drop in
the relative price offish, substitution occurs in the processing
sector (presumably wastage increases), and labor input to the
processing sector falls to 31M man-hours. Fishermen's income
falls but medium-longiiner (tonnage class 2) fishermen remain at
about the poverty line. It is apparent, however, that with the
large expansion of the fishery, 19% is far too small a margin for
full recovery of capital costs. The required margin is 25%. In
Run 4, this margin is obtained by further cutting fish prices toEmployment Prospects in a Commercially Viable Fishery 251
two-thirds of their original level. Processing sector labor falls
further to 28M man-hours and fishermen in medium-sized long-
liners—as well as those in the smaller inshore vessels—have
earnings on average below the poverty line.
Since a viable fishery requires fishermen to eam more than
the poverty line and in Run 4 inshore fishermen on average earn
less that this amount, in Run 5 we reallocate the inshore catch
to the offshore sector. The gross margin remains at 25%, all
classes of fishermen earn incomes in excess of the poverty line,
processing sector labor requirements remain at 28M man-hours,
but the number of fishermen required to harvest the optimal
catch falls to 6K.-^'^ As a rough approximation, this figure can be
taken to represent the long term prospects for employment in
Newfoundland's fish harvesting sector in the absence of major
technological progress. Any such progress would likely only fur-
ther reduce the number of fishermen.
Sensitivity Analysis
With any simulation exercise, the question arises of the degree
to which the results are robust with respect to particular as-
sumptions. If the model solutions are highly unstable when pa-
rameter or variable values are altered, then the usefulness of the
model is placed in serious doubt. The obtaining of "reasonable"
solutions under the altered conditions suggests, at least, that
there is no prima facie case against the mode! and the results of
the simulation might be interesting as reflecting upon the world
which is being modelled. In this section, we briefly discuss the
effects of, first, a relative increase in the price of fish products
and, second, an increase in the price of marine fuel.
In Run 6. the conditions of Run 2 are replicated except that
the price offish products is increased by 20%. With output held
constant, revenues rise, and the gross margin rises from 6.9%
in Run 2 to 22%. Only a 3% reduction in the price of fish is
required for the fish companies to cover their capital costs. Since
harvesting conditions have not been changed, 30K fishermen are
still required but 25K of these are on small boats and small long-
liners and are earning well less than poverty line incomes. Real-252 William E. Schrank, Noel Roy, and Eugene Tsoa
locating the harvests of vessels in tonnage classes zero and one
to the offshore in Run 7, the number of fishermen falls to 7K.
Amortizing the increased number of offshore vessels, however,
would require an increase in gross margin to 27.5%, and the price
offish would have to fall by 12%. All remaining fishermen would
earn incomes in excess of the poverty line.
The method of projecting costs to 1981 that is discussed in
Schrank, Tsoa, and Roy (1984, p. 7.4) generates a fuel cost that
is one and one-third times its value for 1978, while the actual
increase in the industry selling price of refinery products during
that period was nearly two and one-third. In Run 8, we return
to the conditions of Run 2 except that fuel costs of vessels are
suitably adjusted upwards.^^ We would expect this change to
adversely effect the offshore sector relative to the inshore sector.
With the increase in the operating costs of the trawlers, the gross
margin falls, from 6.9% in Run 2 to 4.8% in Run 8. The price of
raw fish must fall in Run 8 by more than was necessary in Run
2 for the processing/trawler companies to break even, but the
increased reduction is modest, the effect on the number of fish-
ermen earning less than the poverty line is nil, and the detailed
results, therefore, are not presented here.
In summary, the sensitivity analyses show the model to be
robust and, to the degree that it adequately refiects conditions
in the real world, the analyses provide interesting results con-
cerning reactions of the fishery to changes in prices and fuel
costs. A relative increase in the price of fish products to costs
of 20%, as appeared in the sensitivity analysis, is substantial and
would depend on the vagaries of the international marketplace.
Such an increase would go a long way towards rendering the
fish companies viable but it would not improve the situation of
the fishermen. Switching harvests to tonnage classes of vessels
where fishermen earn incomes greater than the poverty line
would reduce the number of fishermen dramatically, by more
than three-quarters. An increase in the cost of marine fuel of
nearly three-quarters has only a minor effect on the fishery.
While the increased cost clearly impinges more strongly on the
offshore than on the inshore fleets,^^ the differential impact is
not so great that the rank ordering of the cost-effectiveness of
vessels in alternative tonnage classes is changed.Employment Prospects in a Commercially Viable Fishery 253
Conclusions
We have discussed a large econometric model of the Newfound-
land groundfishery and have applied the model to investigate the
implications for fishermen's employment of policy changes that
would reduce government financial support for the fishery in
favor of a ''commercially viable," self-sufficient, fishery.
The results are dramatic. We have assumed that the New-
foundland fishery increases its harvests of cod and redfish far
beyond its historical experience, and that no marketing problems
arise in selling the output of the processing sector. We further
assumed that prices paid to fishermen for their catch were ad-
justed downward to permit the owners of processing plants and
the offshore fleet to financially break even. Finally we assumed
a reallocation of harvest by fishing technique so that surviving
fishermen would earn a "reasonable" income from fishing. The
resulting scenario would see the inshore harvesting sector elim-
inated; a total of only six thousand fishermen would remain in
the industry.
Under the unlikely assumption that there would be no ration-
alization of the fish processing sector of the industry, the tre-
mendously increased harvest would result in an increase of about
lOM man-hours offish plant employment. While this increase in
employment would ease the shock of the reduction in the number
of fishermen, it would fall far short of fully compensating for
it.^^ It is highly unlikely, however, that an industry moving to-
wards economic self-sufficiency would not dramatically increase
productivity (and therefore limit employment) in the processing,
as well as the harvesting, sector. As well, the reallocation from
inshore to offshore harvesting would likely result in a reallo-
cation of processing jobs from seasonal inshore employment to
year-round offshore employment. It is possible that processing
employment would actually fall as a result. In other words, the
estimate of 28 million man-hours of labor required by the pro-
cessing sector in Runs four and five may be far too high.
A further implication of the virtually total shift from inshore
to offshore operations is that there would be a massive drop in
unemployment insurance payments to both inshore fishermen
and fish plant workers who will no longer be employed for254 William E. Schrank, Noel Roy, and Eugene Tsoa
enough weeks in the year to qualify for unemployment
insurance.
The policy analysis made by government in its desire to render
the industry financially self-sufficient will be made in the context
of the overall Newfoundland economic situation, a situation that
offers little hope of alternative employment, at least in the short
term.
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79% of the value of seafish landings and 31 % of the value of ilsh prod-
ucts. Schrank, Skoda, Roy, and Tsoa (1987), Tables A.I and VII.
IL Economic Council of Canada (1980), p. 101.
12. St. John's Evening Telegram (July 3, 1984), p. 1.
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13. Kirby (1982), p. vii.
14. The model is discussed in far greater detail in Schrank, Tsoa,
and Roy (1984).
15. On the flow chart, circles represent exogenous inputs to the
model, ovals represent outputs of the model, bold squares represent
further outputs which provide key linkages between the sectors of the
model which are themselves represented by bold rectangles.
16. In this context: labor, energy, fish, and capital.
17. The "surplus" is the difference between revenues and costs,
divided by revenues. Thus, a "negative surplus" of $1.00 for harvests
using a specific technology implies a subsidy of $1.00 for every dollar
offish harvested with that technology. The subsidy might be paid for
by government or the operation might be cross-subsidized from other
company operations. See Schrank, Tsoa. and Roy (1980) for further
details and examples.
18. We have specified a fishery that is demand driven; it is at least
equally possible that the Newfoundland fishery is supply driven. In
this case, either fishing effort (16) or catch (13) can be considered as
exogenous input and the model can be run in reverse.
19. Economic Council of Canada (1980). pp. 84-85.
20. References to the literature and further details of the demand
analysis appear in Tsoa, Schrank. and Roy (1982, 1986).
21. Supply effects have been introduced into single-equation fish-
eries demand models, as in Bell's classic paper (Bell. 1968), but only
in an ad hoc way. The Nerlovian model rationalizes the introduction
of supply effects such as inventory terms.
22. This approach to the estimation of a production technology for
the Newfoundland fish products industry is discussed at length in Roy.
Schrank, and Tsoa (1981).
23. For a discussion ofthe Schaefer model, see Munro (1980), Chap-
ter 2.
24. The headline "4X Haddock Overestimated" from the Atlantic-
Fisherman (April 26, 1985), p. 26, reflects an all too common problem.
25. We restrict the choice of functional form to the general Cobb-
Douglas because more flexible functional forms such as the translog
would, with population unknown, raise horrendous estimation prob-
lems. The generalized Schaefer model is discussed in detail in Tsoa,
Schrank, and Roy (1985).
26. Discussions of this approach appear in Schrank, Tsoa and Roy
(1980) and in Roy, Schrank, and Tsoa (1982).
27. The assumption of exogenous prices of processed fish implies
that Newfoundland is a price taker. With the enormous increase in cod256 William E, Schrank, Noel Roy, and Eugene Tsoa
production anticipated in the policy analysis, this assumption may be
untenable; Newfoundland would play a major role in the United States
market. Price would probably fall as a result of the increased output.
This would require ftrms to lower the price of raw fish even more than
is shown in the simulations, thus reinforcing our conclusions.
28. We define the optimal (or "'quasi-idear') catch on a species basis
(i.e. the optimal catch for cod, flatfish, and redfish). We obtain the
maximum sustainable yield for the nine stocks for which we have gen-
eralized Schaefer estimates and we assume that these tnaximum sus-
tainable yields are the appropriate total allowable catches for all stocks.
To illustrate the computation for cod, we ftnd a maximum sustainable
yield for northern cod (NAFO divisions 2J3KL) to be 548,857 metric
tons and for 3Ps cod to be 71,287 (see Schrank, Tsoa, and Roy, 1984.
p. 9.83). The sum of these two figures, 620.144, is taken as the optimal
catch for all three cod stocks; 2J3KL, 3Ps, and 3Pn4RS. In I98I, the
two cod stocks for which we have estimated generalized Schaefer
models accounted for 74.3% of the cod catch of all three stocks. The
maximum sustainable yield for the three flatfish stocks for which we
have estimated Schaefer models is 80.042 and these stocks represent
83.7% of the non-turbot flatfish catch of 1981. Since turbot is caught
in substantial quantities and the time series for this species is too short
to permit Schaefer estimation, we add the 1981 actual turbot catch
(2GHJ3KL) to the maximum sustainable yield to obtain an 'optimal'
flatfish catch of 104,216 metric tons. Similarly, for redfish, we use the
204,568 metric ton maximum sustainable yield obtained from the es-
timation of generalized Schaefer models for four stocks as the optimal
catch for all eight redftsh stocks. In 1981, the four Schaefer stocks
accounted for 55.1% of the total redfish catch. We are underestimating
the ideal optimal catches.
29. Our results will therefore be overoptimistic since firms would
require a larger gross margin if they were to make a profit. Our as-
sumptions are therefore extremely conservative but by making them
we avoid the contentious issue of deciding what would be a "reason-
able" level of profits.
30. The scale economies reported in Schrank, Tsoa, and Roy (1984),
while appropriate for the sample period, are too great to be continued
for substantial increases in production beyond those encountered dur-
ing the sample period. As an approximation, we treat the scale economy
variables as constants set at their 1981 values. One result is that the
gross margin becomes invariant to output, assuming that prices remain
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31. This is one of the figures cited by Kirby (1982), p. 66.
32. Inshore vessels include motorboats and trapboats (tonnage class
0, less than ten tons, motorboats of 18'-22' and trapboats of 22'-39'),
small longliners (tonnage class 1, ten to twenty-five tons, 35'-45') and
medium-sized longliners (tonnage class 2. twenty-five to fifty tons, 55').
Offshore vessels are large longliners (tonnage class 3, fifty to one
hundred-fifty tons. 65'), medium-sized wetfish trawlers (tonnage class
4, one hundred-fifty to four hundred-fifty tons, < 145') and large wetftsh
trawlers (tonnage class 5, five hundred to one thousand tons, >145').
The details of vessels in these tonnage classes, as well as their cost
structures and the assumption concerning the share of fishermen's in-
come generated by groundftsh operations, are discussed in Schrank.
Tsoa, and Roy (1980).
33. It may seem politically unfeasible to cut the price offish but
there exist potential methods of accomplishing much the same purpose.
Plans are currently underway to require that all fish sold to processing
plants will have been bled, gutted, washed and iced on board the har-
vesting vessel. Obviously the gross output of a vessel will decline sub-
stantially when fish must be bled and gutted, rather than landed
"round", as heretofore. If the price offish rises (ostensibly to com-
pensate the fishermen for the better quality fish), but by less propor-
tionately than the catch falls, then in effect the price offish will have
dropped. Our assumption of a drop in the price of fish is therefore not
as unreasonable as it may at first seem.
34. Inshore fishermen are assumed to be paid on a share of gross
revenue basis while trawlermen are paid on a share basis plus a per
diem rate for sea time.
35. Reallocating the inshore catch to the offshore sector substan-
tially increases the required number of offshore vessels and the gross
margin of 25% is no longer adequate. A further reduction in the price
of fish to 49% of its original value is necessary to restore viability.
Although fishermen's earnings would obviously fall, none would fall
to below the poverty line.
36. Substitution effects of the change in relative prices are ignored.
In addition, since energy costs in the processing sector are small (about
3% of total processing sector costs), the effect on the processing sector
of the increase in the price of fuel is also ignored.
37. The total cost of vessel operations increases by less than 1% for
small boats (tonnage class zero) and by 8.6% for large trawlers (tonnage
class five) as a result of the rise in fuel prices.
38. If fish plant workers are assumed to work fifty hours per week258 • William E. Schrank, Noel Roy, and Eugene Tsoa
for a fifteen week season, the increase in employment would be I3K
workers while the drop in the number of fishermen would be closer to
24K.
39. This model, together with the implications of the stochastic
terms, is discussed in greater detail in Tsoa, Schrank, and Roy (1985),
pp. 44-50. Support for relatively simple models that omit biological
detail (such as age structure) is offered in a recent paper by Ludwig
and Walters (1985).
40. Equation (12) assumes a linear relationship between Q and E.
In Roy, Tsoa, and Schrank (1986) we have shown that this assumption
does not bias the estimate of a obtained from Equation (11) when the
results of Equation (12) are used in the computation of the aggregate
effort variable.
41. This estimator is biased, but the bias is known and can be cor-
rected for. See Schrank, Tsoa, and Roy (1984), pp. 5.47-5.52.
42. Revenues and costs of the harvesting sector are discussed in
greater detail in Chapter 7 of Schrank, Tsoa, and Roy (1984).
Appendix
Equations Referred to in the Text
Demand Sector
Sf = 0L0 + aiPfPI^, (1)
5, = 5,-1 + X,(5,* - S,-i) (2)
Uy = Pf + X2(/>, - />f) + 2 8,A, (3)
ef = Po + Pi/*, + ^iP? + Pa^-i + ^AQti (4)
S. - Sr-i ^Q, + M, - Qi (5)
where: D represents monthly binary variables;
M represents United States imports;
P represents price;
P" represents expected price;
/*" represents the price of substitute products;
Q represents United States production;
Q'' represents United States demand;
5 represents inventories held in the United States;
S* represents desired inventories;
Y represents United States personal income;Employment Prospects in a Commercially Viable Fishery 259
and the subscript t associated with a stock variable represents the stock
at the end of period /, and t associated with a flow variable has the
usual interpretation of identifying the period over which the flow
occurs.
, + A/, = Po + PiP, + (2 - X, - \2)(S.-i - Sr-2)
*( + P3K/-1 -1- p3i2f^i + 2 ^'^" (6)
i
where 9; = Xiai(8, - 5,_i)
Processing Sector
where: C represents cost;
Fi represents the required input of factor /;
t represents time;
W, represents the unit price of factor /; and
X represents output.
GMRG = ( 2 Pi^i - 2 Pj'^j] / 2 Pi^i (8)
a-I 7-t / / .-t
where: / refers to the /th product;
j refers to thejth non-capital factor; and
GMRG represents gross margin.
Harvesting Sector
Qr = e'E^P^ (9)
P, - P,-x = aP,^, - bPJ^y - Q, (10)260 William E. Schrank, Noel Roy, and Eugene Tsoa
where: £ represents effort;
P represents fish population; and
Q represents catch.^^^






{QlE)ijkrmt ^ Catch (in metric tons) of groundftsh per day fishing
for vessels of the /th gear type and j\.\\ tonnage class
in the rth NAFO division, mX\\ month of the tX\\ year
when the main (or target) species is the Alh;
G, = Dummy variable representing the (th gear type;
Vj = Dummy variable representing the j\\\ vessel tonnage
class;
Rr = Dummy variable representing the rth NAFO division;
Kk = Dummy variable representing the kX\\ main species;
Mm = Dummy variable representing the mth month;
Y, = Dummy variable representing the /th year;
Pp = Dummy variable representing years p and after;
and there is a stochastic term which is not shown here."***
The relative productivity weight for the ij gear type/vessel class com-
bination for the Ath species for the pth range of years with respect to
an alternative gear type/vessel class combination is the 9 deftned in
Equation (13):*"
Revenue of the harvesting sector is obtained from Equations (14)
and (15) below.^^
R-ijkl = Q.ijkl x PQ.ijkl (14)Employment Prospects in a Commercially Viable Fishery 261
where: Q.ijkl represetits the catch of species k from stock / using
gear lypcj from vessels of class /;
PQ.ijkl represents the associated unit price of catch Q.ijkl;
and
R.ijkl represents the total landed value of catch Q.ijkl
Total revenue of a vessel class then equals:
RJ = SSS^-'V^/ n5)
/ k i
The harvesting sector costs section of the model is a complicated
collection of identities resting upon exogenous unit costs and man-
power and vessel requirements which are themselves determined
higher in the recursive ordering of the model. Here we summarize some
of the major components of this part of the model.
TGC.ijk = GCU.ijk x V.ijk ,. (16)
THC.ijk = HCU.ijk x V.ijk (17)
SCSH.ijk = SCRP.ijk x R.ijk (18)
SCSH.j = 2 S SCSH.ijk/MT.j (19)
TPPP.j = SCSH.j + PDCR.j X DAS.j (20)
TFNC.ijk - FNCC.ijk x V.ijk (21)
, FUEL.ijk + MANT.ijk + DTH.ijk
TOC.ijk = .
DAS.ijk
X DF.ijk X V.ijk (22)
TCJ = TPPP.j + 22 [TFNC.ijk + TOC.ijk
i k
+ THC.ijk + TGC.ijk] (23)
where the subscript: / represents a gear type;
j represents a vessel class; and
k represents a species of fish.
and where:
DAS represents annual days at sea;
DF represents annual days fishing;
FNCC represents annual fixed non-capital cost per vessel;
P¥ IPT t-iJnr*»c(»nf e cinniinl f'iir>l i-nci riPr VACC*^!'
ny\j\^ it^ita^iiia aiiiiuai IIA^..U iiv^ii-vapiiai «.v^
FUEL represents annual fuel cost per vessel;262 William E. Schrank, Noel Roy. and Eugene Tsoa
GCU represents unit annual cost of gear cost;
HCU represents unit annual cost of hull and engine;
MANT represents annual maintenance cost per vessel;
MT represents the total number of shipper and crew;
OTH represents annual miscellaneous operating costs per
vessel;
PDCR represents per diem crew payments for time at sea;
SCRP represents skipper plus crew percentage share of the
catch;
SCSH represents skipper plus crew share of the catch;
TC represents total cost;
TFNC represents total fixed non-capital cost;
TGC represents total gear cost;
THC represents total hull and engine cost;
TOC represents total operating cost;
TPPP represents total payment per person per year; and
V represents the number of vessels.
The surplus of the harvesting sector is:
S = (E RJ - 2 TC.j)/^ R.j • (24)
J J J
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